Keystroke Dynamics Authentication For Collaborative Systems by Giot, Romain et al.
 
 
Keystroke Dynamics Authentication For Collaborative Systems  
 
 
Romain Giot, Mohamad El-Abed, Christophe Rosenberger 
GREYC Laboratory , ENSICAEN – University of CAEN – CNRS 
romain.giot@ensicaen.fr, melabed@greyc.ensicaen.fr,christophe.rosenberger@greyc.ensicaen.fr 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
We present in this paper a study on the ability and the benefits of using a keystroke dynamics authentication method for 
collaborative systems. Authentication is a challenging issue in order to guarantee the security of use of collaborative 
systems during the access control step. Many solutions exist in the state of the art such as the use of one time passwords 
or smart-cards. We focus in this paper on biometric based solutions that do not necessitate any additional sensor. 
Keystroke dynamics is an interesting solution as it uses only the keyboard and is invisible for users. Many methods have 
been published in this field. We make a comparative study of many of them considering the operational constraints of use 
for collaborative systems.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Collaborative systems are useful for engineers and researchers to facilitate their work [1,2]. User authentication on these 
systems is important as it guarantees that somebody works or shares data with the right person and that only authorized 
individuals can access to a collaborative application or data.  
 
In security systems, authentication and authorization are two complementary mechanisms for determining who can 
access information resources over a network. Authentication systems provides answers to two questions: (i) who is the 
user? and (ii) is the user really who he/she claims himself to be? Authorization is the process of giving individuals access 
to system objects based on their identity. Authorization systems provide the answers of three questions: (i) is user X 
authorized to access resource R?, (ii) is user X authorized to perform operation P? and (iii) is user X authorized to 
perform operation P on resource R? 
 
The authentication process can be based on a combination of one or more authentication factors.  The four widely 
recognized factors to authenticate humans to computers are:  
 Something the user knows, as a password, a pass-phrase or a PIN code. 
 Something the user owns: a security token, a phone or a SIM card, a software token, a navigator cookie. 
 Something that qualifies the user: a fingerprint, a DNA fragment, or a voice pattern for example, or something 
that qualifies the behavior of a user: signature dynamics, keystroke dynamics or a gait for example. 
 
The well-known ID/password (static authentication) is far the most used authentication method. It is widely used despite 
its obvious lack of security. This fact is due to the ease of implementation of this solution, and to the instantaneous 
recognition of that system by the users that facilitates its deployment and acceptance. 
 
Static authentication suffers of many drawbacks, as it is a low-security solution when used without any precaution: 
 Passwords can be shared between users. 
 Password can be stolen on the line by an eavesdropper, and used in order to gain access to the system (replay 
attack). 
 Physical attacks can easily be done, by a camera recording a PIN sequence as it is typed, or by a key logger 
(either software or hardware) to record a password on a computer.  
 Passwords are also vulnerable to guessing attacks, like brute force attacks or dictionary attacks or through social 
engineering attacks (highly facilitate by social networks providing many personal information of an individual). 
However, it is possible to limit the scope of these attacks by adding a delay (of about one second) before 
entering the password and after entering a wrong password. 
 
Increasing the password strength is a solution to avoid dictionary attacks or to make brute force attacks infeasible. It is 
generally accepted that the length of the password determines the security it provides, however, it is not exactly true: the 
strength of the password is rather related to its entropy. As for example, a user that choose a  password of 7 characters is 
said to provide between 16 and 28 bits of entropy. 
 
Biometrics is often presented as a promising alternative[3]. The main advantage of biometrics is that it is usually more 
difficult to copy the biometric characteristics of an individual than most of other authentication methods such as 
passwords or tokens. Of course, many attacks exist and the goal of the researcher is to provide more robust systems. 
Fingerprints are the most used biometric modality even if it is quite easy to copy the fingerprint of an individual. In order 
to propose an alternative solution, recent research works propose to use the finger or hand veins as characteristics. The 
biometric technology is used for many applications such as logical and physical access control, electronic payments... 
There exist mainly three different types of biometric information: biological, behavioral and morphological information. 
Biological analysis exploits some information that are present for any alive mammal (DNA, blood). The behavioral 
analysis is specific to a human being and characterizes the way an individual makes some daily tasks (gait, talking) [4-5]. 
Last, morphological analysis uses some information on how we look like (for another individual or for a particular 
sensor) [6]. 
 
Among the different types of biometric systems, keystroke dynamics biometric systems seem to be an interesting solution 
for logical access control for many reasons: 
 this biometric system does not necessitate any additional sensor, 
 users acceptability is high as it is natural for everybody to type a password for authentication purposes, 
 this kind of biometric system respects the privacy of users. Indeed, if the biometric template of an individual has 
been stolen, the user just has to change its password. 
 
We propose to study in this paper how the use of this biometric system could be appropriated for the authentication of an 
individual who wants to access to a collaborative system. We consider security aspects (in terms of authentication errors), 
usability and collaborative environment constraints (essentially few required data from user to create his model and don't 
change his habits). The plan of the paper is given as follows. The next section gives an overview of the literature in the 
domain. Section three presents the results of a comparative study on many methods from the state of the art we realized. 
We discuss the ability of this authentication method to fit the requirements and constraints of this application (ease of use, 
speed, low organizational and technical impacts...). We conclude and give the different perspectives of this study.   
 
2. STATE OF THE ART 
 
Research about keystroke dynamics have begun more than twenty years ago. In [7], authors have made the first work to 
our knowledge on authentication with keystroke dynamics. They have shown that, like signature dynamics, keystroke 
typing can characterize a user. This study was done by a database consisting of the work of  seven secretaries who have 
been asked to type three pages of text. We can easily see that this approach is not really an operational solution for 
collaborative applications (nobody would agree to type such a huge quantity of data), but many amelioration have been 
done since.  
 
2.1. Main Approaches 
 
The main scheme for keystroke dynamics is presented in Figure 1:  
(i) the enrollment (which consists of registering the user in the system) embeds the data capture, eventually some 
data filtering, the feature extraction, and the learning step; 
(ii) the verification process realizes the data capture, the feature extraction and the comparison with the biometric 
model. 
Depending on the studies, this scheme may be slightly modified. Some algorithms can also adapt the model of the user by 
adding the template created during the last successful authentication. 
 
Figure 1. General Synopsis Of A 
Common Biometric System.  
Two main families of keystroke 
dynamics systems exist. The first 
one is based on free texts. During 
the enrollment, a huge quantity of 
text have to be typed to create the 
user's model. For the verification, 
the procedure may be different 
because the user is asked to type 
different texts. The other family 
uses static texts : the same 
password is used for both 
enrollment and authentication.  
 
In most studies, the quantity of information used to create the profile during the enrollment process is really huge. 
Systems using neural networks need hundred of data and most of statistical methods need at least twelve captures. This 
huge quantity of data is an obstacle for users. 
 
2.2. Principles 
 
In most articles of the literature, the following data are captured (see Figure 2): (i) the hold time of a key : which is the 
duration of key pressure (T3-T1) and (ii) the inter-key time : which is the delay between the release of a key and the 
pressure of the next one (T3-T2).  
 
Figure 2. Capture Information In Keystroke Dynamics Systems 
 
Other measures can also be captured [8] : the duration of password typing, the use of  “invisible keys” (like 
BACKSPACE) in order to add entropy (or count the typing error rate of the user). 
 
Data cleaning can be done to improve the system's performance. In [9], times superior to 500ms are ignored (they are 
considered as a result of a perturbation of the user). In [10], a reduction of the dimensions is done by using genetic 
algorithm associated to the Support Vector Machine algorithm.  
 
Different features extraction methods exist. Sometimes, the raw data are used without any transformations. Other times, 
researchers prefer to work with n-graphs instead of di-graph (i.e., they use the association of more than two letters, three 
seems to be a good number as compromise). In [9] the extracted features are simple vectors of four dimension: (i) 
Manhattan distance of  inter key time, (ii) Manhattan distance of  hold time, (iii) Euclidean distance of  inter key time, and 
(iv) Euclidean distance of  hold time. 
 
Depending on the study, different algorithms are used during the learning procedure. The most classical methods of 
model creation, in the literature, are the following: (a) computing of the mean and standard deviation of  time vectors, (b) 
creating clusters with different algorithms (Support Vector Machine, K-nearest neighbor, K-means), (c) Bayesian 
classification, (d) neuronal networks. 
 
During the verification process, the user is told to type the password. The resulting template of this input is compared 
with the biometric model of the claimed user and a distance score or a class is returned. The main procedures are: (a) 
minimal distance computing, (b) statistical methods, (c) verification of class matching, (d) time based discretization or (e) 
bioinformatics tools. The score is compared with a threshold in order to authenticate or not the user. So, the robustness of 
the biometric system depends a lot of this threshold configuration. 
 
2.3. Existing Methods 
 
Table 1 shows the estimated Error Equal Rate (corresponding to a compromise error that will be formally defined later in 
the paper) of several methods presented in the literature. As most articles do not provide value for the EER, an estimated 
value is presented in Table 1,  we compute it by doing the average of errors of rejected genuine users and accepted 
impostors. This estimated error rate, for most of the articles, is lower than 10% and the best rates are obtained while using 
data-mining methods which need many data and don't fit our requirements. 
Table 1. Authors, Methods And Estimated EER Ordered By Year Of Publication 
 
2.4. Discussion 
 
Performance of systems can be improved by using multi-
modality: the fusion of the scores from several methods is 
operated. 
 
Because most systems use a very huge quantity of data during 
the enrollment step, those methods are not easily usable in a real 
life application such as collaborative systems. The user needs 
too much investments and will prefer keeping a classical 
password authentication solution. It is a real problem because 
keystroke dynamics is one of the less intrusive biometric 
system. That's why, in the next part, a comparative study is presented by keeping in mind the fact that the system has to 
be used in a collaborative system (only five vectors, or inputs, compose the model and the response is instantaneous). 
 
Another way of improving the system's performances is to consider the fact that the user learns how to type the password 
all along his typing. That's why it's quite important to add the last template to the model. 
 
3. COMPARATIVE STUDY 
 
To have a good overview on the performances of the existing methods for an operational use, we have created an 
experimental protocol that aims to test several points: the capture process, the performance of existing algorithms and  the 
perception of users about the system. It's aim is also to compare original performances in a specific environment with the 
performance in a more realistic environment. First, we present the experimental protocol, then the selected methods from 
the state of the art for this experiment, and then the results we obtained. 
 
3.1. Experimental Protocol 
 
3.1.1. Test Population 
We asked to sixteen individuals, during three sessions, to enroll themselves in our biometric system with the password  
“laboratoire greyc”. During each session, the user was asked to type correctly five times the password (there is fifteen 
Article Method Estimated EER
Umphress and Williams (1985) [11] statistical 9.00%
Bleha et al (1990) [12] bayes 5.45%
Obaidat and Sadoun (1997) [13] neuronal networks 5.8%
Robinson et al (1998) [14] statistical 10,00%
Coltell et al (1999) [15] statistical 17.5%
Bergadano et al (2002) [16] disorder mesure 2,00%
Kacholia and Pandit (2003) cauchy distribution 2.9%
Guven and Sogukpinar (2003) [17] cosine 6.35%
Yu and Cho (2004) [18] SVM 3.14%
Rodrigues et al (2006) [19] HMM 3.6%
Clarke and Furnell (2006) [20] neuronal networks 5,00%
Filho and Freire (2006) [21] HMM and statistical 6,00%
Hwang et al (2006) [9] SVM 0.25%
Hoquet et al (2007) [22] statistical and fusion 5,00%
Revett et al. (2007) [23] bioinformatic 0.175%
vector per user). The first five vectors are used for the enrollment process of the biometric system, while the  others are 
used to test the system.  
 
The individuals who took place to the protocol have a daily use of computer, they are familiar with a keyboard. The test 
population is composed of thirteen males and three females and their ages are between twenty-three and forty-five years 
old. 
 
3.1.2. Acquisition Procedure 
In order to take into account typing learning problems (modification of typing all along the time),  the sessions took place 
during different days. The first session took place the 14th and 17th of November, and session 2 and 3 took place 
respectively the 18th and 19th of November. 
The users could come when they wanted.  
 
3.1.3. Captured Data 
As presented in [22], the acquired biometric templates contain: (i) the time between two keys pressure (T2-T1) noted PP, 
(ii) the time between two keys release (T4-T3) noted RR, (iii) the time between one release and one pressure (T2-T3) 
noted RP, (iv) time between one pressure and one release (T3-T1) noted PR. In addition of these data, other were 
captured, they are presented in the performance evaluation section. 
 
3.1.4. Keystroke Dynamics Algorithms 
Five matching methods were tested. These methods are presented in the literature and seem to match the best of our 
requirements (few template used for enrollment, computationally simple).  
The first tested method is presented in [12]. The value v is the column test vector and u is the column mean vector of 
enroll vectors : 
score 1=
v− ut v− u
 ∥v ∥. ∥u ∥  (1) 
 
The second tested method is presented in [22]. It is a statical method based on the average (u) and standard deviation 
vectors (s) computed with the enrollment vectors, with v a test vector of n dimensions: 
score 2= 1− 1n∑ e
−vi−ui
si
 (2) 
 
The third method was initially created for free text, but also seemed adapted for passwords [24]. It computes the 
Euclidean distance between the test vector with each enrolled vector and keeps the minimal one. 
score 3=minu∈enrollvectors∑ui− vi2 (3) 
 
Another score method consists in computing the square of the norm of the average enrolled vectors subtracted to the test 
vector [21]. 
score 4=∥v− u∥²  (4) 
 
The last method is based on the Euclidean distance  between units vectors. The distance of unit test vector is compared 
with the distance of unit mean of the unit enroll vectors.  
score 5=∑ui− vi²  (5) 
 
The first four methods are tested in an off-line mode (with registered data and without any user presence), while the fifth 
one is used in an on-line mode (while the user is using the application). 
 
Different kinds of biometric templates have also been tested (the four vector time presented before plus a vector (V) 
consisting of their concatenation). The user changes his way of typing as long as he types it. In order to confirm that fact, 
the following methods have also been tested by : (i) keeping the five first vectors for enrollment (static mode),  (ii) 
releasing the last enrollment vector and replacing it by the last tested one (adaptive mode),  (iii) adding the last tested 
vector to the set of enrolled vectors (progressive mode).  By using these variations, the number of different alternatives of 
each off-line method is 15 so, 60 different flavors are tested. 
 
3.2. Performance Evaluation 
 
It is necessary to analyze the performance of such a system to know if it is usable in a collaborative environment. 
Objective and subjective evaluations must be both realized. 
 
3.2.1. Algorithms Performances 
The efficiency of a biometric algorithm can be analyzed with the following measures : (i) the False Acceptation Rate 
(FAR), which is the proportion of authenticated  impostors, (ii) the False Rejection Rate (FRR), which is the proportion 
of rejected  genuine users, (iii) the Failure To Acquire rate (FTA), which is the proportion of biometric template that the 
system could not capture, (iv) the Error Equal Rate (EER), which the rate when the FAR is equal to the FRR, and (v) the 
ROC curves which plot FRR versus FAR for all the possible threshold values. It is a good representation of the 
performance of the algorithm. 
 
3.2.2. Biometric Modality Performance 
In addition to the biometric acquisition, other data have been captured : (a) the time to type the whole password, (b) the 
time to type all the passwords during the session, (c) the number of errors during the  session (when the user makes a 
mistake while typing the password, he cannot correct it and has to type it again from scratch), and (d)  subjective 
evaluation questionnaire during the last session. 
 
3.2.3. User Perception 
At the end of the last session, users were asked (I) to try to authenticate themselves three times in the system, (ii) to try to 
identify themselves and (iii) to answer to the following questions : 
Q1: Is the verification fast? Yes, no 
Q2: Is the system easy to use? Yes, no 
Q3: Are you ready to use this system in the future? Yes, no, do not know 
Q4: Do you feel confident in this system? Yes, no 
Q5: Do you feel embarrassed when using this system? Yes, no, do not know 
Q6: What is your general appreciation of the system? Very good, good, average, bad 
 
The aim of this questionnaire is to give an idea of the user's perception after using the system. It gives us some 
information on its acceptance and if it could be used in real life (Where is the interest to do this kind of authentication in 
collaborative environment if no users agreed with the system ?). The questionnaire was presented after the steps of testing 
authentication and identification . 
 
3.3. Experimental Results 
 
Several types of results can be analyzed: the figures extracted during the whole protocol, the biometric algorithm 
performance and the answers of the subjective analysis.  
 
3.3.1. Acquisition 
Due to the learning typing effects, and different levels of user concentration during the sessions, the timing results are 
slightly different for the data of the first session and the whole data set. For most users, the minimum and average typing 
speed of the password have decreased (they ameliorate their way of typing), and the maximum time of typing has 
increased (due to the lack of concentration and perturbations from environment) for very few of them .  
 
We can also see that the standard deviation of typing speed is more important with the whole data than with the data of 
one session. This can be interpreted by the problem of learning typing. That is why it is preferable to work with the last 
patterns and not all of them to avoid this effect. The users with a biggest increase of standard deviation (so, the less 
constant typing users), are the ones with an increase of maximum time.  
 
The timings for the the sessions have also been compared. They are shown in the figure 3. The duration of the first 
session is more important than the two others, because it has consisted of : (i) quickly explain the project (most of them 
were already aware of what is related to), (ii) explain what the user has to do, (iii) type two times the password (to adapt 
himself to the keyboard , the chair and the password), (iv) add the user to the application, (v) type the five valid 
passwords. The others sessions have only consisted in (i) selecting the user, (ii) typing the five valid passwords. Except 
one user, the time for session 2 and 3 are quite similar. 
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Figure 3. Values On Durations Off Time Typing For Each User For All The Three Sessions 
The captured data are the keystroke timing of valid passwords (a typing error implies to type all the password again). The 
Figure 4 shows the FTA rate for each user (X axis represents the users and Y axis is the percentage of error during 
enrollment). The average FTA is about sixteen percent, which is a quite huge number. Users with the biggest FTA are: (i) 
the one who wanted to type too fast and did mistakes, (ii) the ones who are not concentrated or disturbed while typing, 
and (iii) others who do not feel very comfortable with the protocol. 
 
 
Figure 4. FTA Of Each User 
For The Whole Protocol.  
 
3.3.2. On-line Performance 
At the end of the last session, 
users has to authenticate 
themselves three times and 
identify themselves one time. 
The Figure 5 shows the results 
of this analysis. 
 
64% of users were correctly identified in one try. 50% of users have been correctly authenticated during all of the three 
tests, 85% have been correctly authenticated at least two times, and 100% of users have been correctly authenticated at 
least one time. In a system allowing only three password tests before locking the account, all the users would have been  
authenticated.  
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Figure 5. Results Of The Three Authentications And The Identification Of The Users 
 
3.3.3. Off-line Performance 
Even if 100% of the users are authenticated in at worst three tries, the performances of the algorithm described by 
equation (5), and used during the protocol, are far of being good. The Figure 6 presents the score distribution (depending 
on the threshold) and the ROC curve. 
 
The first curve indicates that to obtain the EER, the threshold of the system must configured to 0.28, and the second curve 
shows that the EER is superior of 20%. A such bad rate can be explained by several reasons: the poor quality of the 
algorithm (this work was done before doing the state of the art), the quite small number of users in the database, and the 
fact of using an identical threshold for all users. 
 
 
(a) score distribution 
(b) ROC curve 
Figure 6. Off-line Performance Of The Method Used In An On-line Way 
 
Table 2 gives the EER, computed with the best parameters, of each tested method. The first column is the number of the 
tested method, the second column presents the best biometric template used, the third column shows which kind of 
enrollment method is used, the fourth column presents the EER when the threshold of decision is the same for all the 
users, and the last presents the EER when each user has his own optimized threshold. With our database the best method 
gives an EER value of 9.78% when using a global threshold and 4.28 % when using an individual threshold. 
 
Table 2. Best Performance Of  Off-line Methods From The State Of The Art. 
 
We can see, that it is important to take into account the evolution of typing of users (in the four cases, best methods are 
the progressive or adapting one) and using individual thresholds give better results. 
 
3.3.4. Discussion  
We can see, from the results of the Table 1 and Table 2, that those results do not improve the results of the previous 
researches. This is mainly because our work was done in a more constrained  environment (only five vectors used for the 
enrollment), no filtering is done on the users (all the users with the required number of vectors are taken into account in 
the study, even the ones who decrease the results) or the data and all the users used the same password (so the number of 
patterns to test attacks for each users is much bigger than the number of patterns to test genuine authentication).  
 
It is not an easy task to obtain enough good results which can be used in a collaborative environment. The few number of 
enrollment may be the main point of this performance decrease, that is why we will have to find other methods to improve 
the results while keeping this few number of enrollment.  
 
Although users answered to the questionnaire after testing the worst algorithm of this study, their confidence and general 
appreciation in the system is good for more than 60% of them. 
 
The number of participants of this study is really too small as well as the number of sessions. Following the practices 
exposed in [25] is a good solution. 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS AND PERSPECTIVES 
 
We studied the ability of keystroke dynamics authentication systems for their application to collaborative systems 
(collaborative systems need to authenticate there users). We can see through this study that, even with quite simple 
methods from the state of the art, the obtained results are almost correct (method 2, with less than 5% of error) but need 
yet to be improved. One-class Support Vector Machines with only five vectors per users for the training seems to give 
better results.  
 
In [8], the authors present some useful and easy techniques in order to improve the quality of a keystroke dynamics 
system without modifying the algorithms: it is up to the users of the system to add breaks in their way of typing (they can 
be helped by the software with visual or sonore cues). Maybe these good practices of composing keystroke dynamic 
based passwords could be better accepted than the good practice of classical passwords. 
 
 
 Figure 7. Partial Results Of The Subjective Analysis 
 
In the tested systems, only well typed passwords are taken into 
account. This is a real problem, because with static password based 
authentication methods, the genuine user can correct himself his 
typing errors and being correctly authenticated. On the contrary, 
with our keystroke dynamic implementation, the system will force 
the user to type again the password in order to have a correct sized 
vector. The system and algorithms have to be modified to allow the 
use of  backspace key to correct the password (because errors can 
be characteristic of the user). 
 
There is a lack of data in the analysis of the subjective evaluation. It 
could be a good thing to use statistics tools to filter incoherent answers 
Method Best template Best kind EER 1 EER 2
1 RP progressive 11,64% 10,24%
2 V adaptive 9,78% 4,28%
3 RP adaptive 14,05% 11,09%
4 RR progressive 19,42% 14,06%
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and get relations between  the questions (with the help of Bayesian network ordecision trees). It gives better results to 
compute the robustness of all the algorithms. This could also give more information on the way of how to interpret this 
kind of curves. 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
The authors would like to thank the Basse-Normandie Region and the French Research Ministry for their financial 
support of this work. 
REFERENCES 
 
[1] P. Salis, S. Shammuganathan, L. Pavesi and M. Carmen, J. Muñoz, “A system architecture for collaborative environmental 
modeling research,” International Symposium on Collaborative technologies and systems,  2008, pp. 39-47. 
 
[2] J. Ekanayake, S. Pallickara and G. Fox, “A collaborative framework for scientific data analysis and visualization,” International 
Symposium on Collaborative technologies and systems, 2008, pp. 339-346. 
 
[3] J. Mahier, M. Pasquet, C. Rosenberger and F. Cuozzo, “Biometric authentication,” ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INFORMATION 
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY,  2nd edition, 2008. 
 
[4] D. Muramatsu and T. Matsumoto, “Effectiveness of Pen Pressure, Azimuth, and Altitude Features for Online Signature 
Verification,” Proceedings of the International Conference on Advances in Biometrics (ICB), Lecture Notes in Computer Science 4642, 
Springer, 2007, pp. 503-512,. 
 
[5] J. Han and B. Bhanu, “Individual Recognition Using Gait Energy Image,” IEEE Transaction on Pattern Analysis and Machine 
Intelligence, Vol. 28, No. 2, 2006, pp. 316-322. 
 
[6] A. Adler and M.E. Suckers, “Comparing Human and Automatic Face recognition Performance,” IEEE Transactions on Systems, 
Man, and Cybernetics, Vol. 37, 2007, pp. 1248-1255. 
 
[7] R. Gaines, S. Press, W. Lisowski and N. Shapiro, “Authentication by keystroke timing : some preliminary results. Rapport 
technique,” Rand Corporation, 1980. 
 
[8] J. Ilonen, “Keystroke dynamics,” Advanced Topics in Information Processing--Lecture.  (2003) 
 
[9] S. Hwang, H . Lee and S. Cho, “Improving Authentication Accuracy of Unfamiliar Passwords with Pauses and Cues for Keystroke 
Dynamics-Based Authentication,” WISI, LNCS 3917, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg,  2006, pp. 73-78. 
 
[10] Y. Zhao, “Learning User Keystroke Patterns for Authentication,”, Proceeding of World Academy of Science, Engineering and 
Technology, Vol 14, 2006, pp.  65-70. 
 
[11] D. Umphress and G. Williams, “Identity verification through keyboard characteristics,” Internat. J. Man–Machine Studies, Vol. 
23, 1985, pp.  263-273. 
 
[12] S. Bleha, C. Slivinsky and B. Hussien, “Computer-Access Security Systems Using Keystroke Dynamics,” IEEE Transactions On 
Pattern Analysis And Machine Intelligence, Vol. 12, No. 12, 1990, pp. 1216-1222. 
 
[13] M. Obaidat and B. Sadoun, “Verification of computer users using keystroke dynamics,” Systems, Man and Cybernetics, Part B, 
IEEE Transactions on, Vol. 27, 1997, pp.  261-269. 
 
[14] J. Robinson, V. Liang,  J. Chambers and C. MacKenzie, “Computer user verification using login string keystroke dynamics,” 
Systems, Man and Cybernetics, Part A, IEEE Transactions on,  Vol. 28,  1998, pp.  236-241. 
 
[15] O. Coltell, J. Badfa and G. Torres, “Biometric identification system based on keyboard filtering,” IEEE International Carnahan 
Conference on Security Technology, 1999, pp.  203-209. 
 
[16] F. Bergadano, D. Gunetti and C. Picardi, “User authentication through keystroke dynamics,” ACM Transactions on Information 
and System Security (TISSEC), ACM New York, NY, USA, 2002, pp.  367-397. 
 
[17] A. Guven and  I. Sogukpinar, “Understanding users' keystroke patterns for computer access security,” Computers & Security, 
Elsevier, Vol. 22, 2003, pp.  695-706. 
 
[18] E. Yu and S. Cho, “Keystroke dynamics identity verification: its problems and practical solutions,” Computers & Security, Vol. 
23, No. 5, 2004, pp  428-440. 
 
[19] R. Rodrigues, G. Yared, C. do NCosta, J. Yabu-Uti, F. Violaro and  L. Ling, “Biometric Access Control Through Numerical 
Keyboards Based on Keystroke Dynamics,” Lecture notes in computer science, Springer, Vol. 3832, 2006, pp. 640-646. 
 
[20] N. Clarke and S. Furnell, “Advanced user authentication for mobile devices,” computers & security, Vol. 27, 2006 pp.  109-119. 
 
[21] J. Filho and E. Freire, “On the equalization of keystroke timing histograms,” Pattern Recognition Letters, Vol. 27, 2006, pp.  
1440–1446. 
 
[22] S. Hocquet, J.-Y. Ramel and H. Cardot, “User Classification for Keystroke Dynamics Authentication,” International Conference 
on Biometrics (ICB), Lecture Notes in Computer Science 4642, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2007, pp. 531-539. 
 
[23] K. Revett, S. de Magalhaes and H. Santos, “On the Use of Rough Sets for User Authentication Via Keystroke Dynamics,” Lecture 
notes in computer science, Springer, Vol. 4874,  2007, pp. 145-159. 
 
[24] F. Monrose, and A. Rubin, “Authentication via keystroke dynamics,” Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Computer and 
communications security,  1997, pp. 48-56. 
 
[25] D. Hosseinzadeh and S. Krishnan, “Gaussian Mixture Modeling of Keystroke Patterns for Biometric Applications,” 
Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part C: Applications and Reviews, IEEE Transactions on, Vol. 38,  2008, pp. 816-826. 
 
[26] V. Kacholia and S. Pandit, “Biometric authentication using random distributions (bioart),” Canadian IT Security Symposium, 
2003. 
